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,ct nature cannot Medical diagnosis involves processes obviously, is a that can be systematically analyzed, as lanation of the well as those characterized as "intan-clinicopathological exercises from Massachusetts General Hospital were studied. It has been necessary to simplify the case illustrations in order to demonstrate the calculations in their entirety. Two well-known mathematical disciplines, symbolic logic and probability, contribute to our understanding of the reasoning foundations of medical diagnosis; a third mathematical discipline, value theory, can aid the choice of an optimum treatment. These three basic concepts are inherent in any medical diagnostic procedure, even when the diagnostician utilizes them subconsciously, or on an "intuitive" level.
As is shown below, the logical concepts inherent in medical diagnosis emphasize the fundamental importance of considering combinations of symptoms or symptom complexes in conjunction with combinations of diseases or disease complexes. This point is emphasized because often an evaluation is made of a sign or symptom (4) by itself with respect to each possible disease by itself, whereas consideration of the combinations of signs and symptoms that the patient does and does not have in relation to possible combinations of diseases is of primary importance in diagnosis.
The probabilistic concepts inherent in medical diagnosis arise because a medical diagnosis can rarely be made with absolute certainty; the end result of the diagnostic process usually gives a "most likely" diagnosis. The logical considerations present alternative possible disease complexes that the patient can have; the purpose of the probabilistic considerations is to determine which of these alternative disease complexes is "most likely" for this patient.
The value theory concepts inherent in medical diagnosis and treatment are concerned with the important value decisions that the diagnostician frequently faces when he is choosing between alternative methods of treatment. The problem facing the physician is to choose that treatment which will maximize the chance of curing the patient under the ethical, social, economic, and moral constraints of our society. As is discussed below, Von Neumann's so-called "theory of The patient has both the attribute x and the attribute y. The patient has attribute x or attribute y, or both.
where the plus sign (called logical sum) indicates "or"-that is, the "inclusive or." The sentence:
If the patient has attribute x, then he has attribute y.
is symbolized by X -> Y. All these symbols and their meanings are summarized in Table 1 . But they can be most easily visualized by considering, for example, the population of patients illustrated in Fig. 1 Of course, in general, more than two attributes are usually considered, and more complicated expressions can be formed by making combinations of attributes. Such expressions are called "Boolean functions" and are generally denoted in terms of the usual functional notation f(X, Y, . . ., Z). Similarly, for more than two attributes, we can classify the patients into more than four classes Ci. In fact, it is easy to see that for m attributes, there are 2m possible ways the patients can and cannot have the m attributes-that is, there are 2m of the 3 JULY 1959 classes Ci, namely, Co, C1,..., C2m_. For our purposes, we need only introduce attributes that are symptoms and diseases. Let the symbol S (1) mean, "The patient has symptom 1," and similarly for S(2), and so forth. Let the symbol D(1) mean, "The patient has disease 1," and similarly for D(2), and so forth. In general, a set of n symptoms, 
G=S(1) .S(2) then it turns out that f=D(l) .D(2)
Although we shall discuss a specific example below, it is important to first state the logical problem of medical diagnosis in more abstract terms. The logical aspect of the medical diagnosis problem is to determine the diseases f such that if medical knowledge E is known, then: if the patient presents symptoms G, he has diseases f. In terms of our symbolic language, the problem is to determine a Boolean function f that satisfies the following formula:
This is the fundamental formula of medical diagnosis. That this is truly the diagnosis in an intuitive sense can be readily seen. For it is easy to show that the fundamental formula can be equivalently written as E -(f -G) 11 Co As another example, suppose the patient presented C1-that is,
G=S(1) .S(2)
then we must consider both column C21 and column C31, since both of these columns include the S (1) S(2) symptom complex. Thus there are two possible disease complexes that the patient may have, C0 or C3. Thus,
f=-D(1) .D(2) +D(1) .D(2)
-that is, the patient has disease D(2) and it is not known whether he has D ( 1 ) or not; either further tests must be taken or else medical knowledge cannot tell whether or not he has D (1) under these circumstances.
Next, suppose the patient has S(2), and it is not known whether he has S (1) or not-that is, C2 or C3, or We have thus demonstrated how, from the reduced basis that embodies medical knowledge and from the symptom complexes presented by the patient, we can determine the possible disease complexes the patient may have, which is the medical diagnosis.
G=S(1) .S(2) +S(1) S(2)

Probabilistic Concepts
Need for probabilities. In the previous section we considered statements such as, "If a patient has disease 2, he must have symptom 2." While such positive statements have a place when, for example, some laboratory tests are being discussed, it is also evident that in many cases, the statement would read, "If a patient has disease 2, then there is only a certain chance that he will have symptom 2-that is, say, approximately 75 out of 100 patients will have symptom 2." Since "chance" or "probabilities" enter into "medical knowledge," then chance, or probabilities, enter into the diagnosis itself. At present it may generally be said that specific probabilities are rarely known; medical diagnostic textbooks rarely give numerical values, although they may use words such as "frequently," "very often," and "almost always." However, as is shown below, it is a relatively simple matter to collect such statistics. Since we are considering topics from an essentially academic point of view, we shall assume that the probabilities are known or can be easily obtained, and we shall discuss methods of utilizing such probabilities in the medical diagnosis. Actually, such a discussion makes clear in any particular circumstances precisely which statistics should be taken and presents methods for rapidly collecting them in the most useful form.
Total and conditional probabilities. The first step in discussing a probabilistic analysis of medical diagnosis is to review some definitions and important properties of probabilities. The concept of total probability is concerned with the following question. Suppose we select at random from our population of 3 JULY 1959 patients one single patient; what is the chance, or total probability, that the patient chosen has certain specified attributes f (x, y, ..., z) ? By definition, the total probability is the ratio of the number of patients that have these attributes to the total number of patients from which the random selection is made. If the total number of patients is N, and if N(f) is the number of these patients with attributes f, then the total probability that a patient has attributes f is: P(f) =N(f)/N (3) For example, the probability that a patient has disease complex Cg becomes: P(Ci) =N(Ci)/N (4) The conditional probability is analogous to the total probability, where the selection is made only from that subpopulation of patients that have the specified condition. The conditional probability, denoted by P(Glf), that from patients having condition or attributes f, a single patient selected at random will also have attributes G is defined as the ratio of the number of patients with both attributes G f to the number of patients having attributes f. LNote: In this notation the condition appears to the right, and the attribute of selection to the left, of the vertical bar: P(attributelcondition) .] Thus we can write:
For example, the conditional probability that a patient with disease complex Ci has symptom complex Ck becomes: have. The problem now is: Which of these choices is most probable-that is, which of the disease complexes given by the logical diagnosis function f is the patient most likely to have. In terms of conditional probabilities, the probabilistic aspect of the diagnosis problem is to determine the probability that a patient has diseases f where it is known that the particular patient presents symptoms G, that is, the probabilistic aspect of medical diagnosis is to evaluate P(flG) for a particular patient. The data upon which the evaluation of P(/[G) is based must, of course, come from medical knowledge. Such medical knowledge is generally also given in the form of conditional probabilitiesnamely, the probability that a patient having disease complex C, will have symptom complex Ck, or P(CkICi). The reason medical knowledge takes this form is because this conditional probability is relatively independent of local environmental factors such as geography, season, and others, and depends primarily on the physiological-pathological aspects of the disease complex itself. Thus the study of the disease processes as a cause for the resulting possible symptom complexes can be expressed as such conditional probabilities: of having a symptom complex on condition that the patient has the disease complex. It is interesting to note that this is also the reason most diagnostic textbooks discuss the symptoms associated with a disease, rather than the reverse, the diseases associated with a symptom.
The question that naturally arises at this point is: If medical knowledge is in the form P(CkjC4)--that is, probability of having the symptoms given the patient having the diseases-then how can we make the diagnosis P(flG)--that is, the probability of having the disease given the patient having the symptoms? The answer lies in the well-known Bayes' formula (8) of probability. Let us first discuss the simpler case where f=Ci and G = Ck; then it can be shown that P(Ci)P(CkICi) P( Ci |Cud) = p(c)P( CklC) (7) where to under 2 indicates summation and P(Ci). The former is just the relation between Ck and C4 given by medical knowledge, which we would certainly expect as a factor in the diagnosis. However, observe the latter factor: it is the total probability that the patient has the disease complex in question, irrespective of any symptoms. This is the factor that takes account of the local aspects--geographical location, seasonal influence, occurrence of epidemics, and so forth. This factor explains why a physician might tell a patient over the telephone: "Your symptoms of headache, mild fever, and so forth, indicate that you probably have Asian flu-it's around our community now, you know." And the physician is more than likely right; he is using the P(Ci) factor in making the diagnosis.
In the more general case, the following adaptation of Bayes' formula can be made for our purposes: krG : P (Ci )P(Ck|Cd)
Example of a simple computation. Table 2 gives hypothetical probabilities for our example that are consistent with our previous example of two diseases and two symptoms. These conditional probabilities and total probabilities were supposed to have been obtained from clinical statistical data and medical knowledge. We can immediately observe that the conditional probabilities corresponding to columns that were eliminated by means of the logical analysis are zero. This is because these columns represent unrelated disease-symptom combinations, according to medical knowledge, and hence there are no patients having these disease-symptom complexes (see cross-hatched columns of Fig. 5 ). Now suppose a patient presented symptom complex
G=S(l) .S(2) = C1
Logical analysis shows that the diagnosis is f=D(1) .D(2) +D(1) .D(2)
The problem now is: Which disease complex does the patient most likely have,
C2D(l) .D(2) or C,D(l) .D (2)
To solve this problem, we calculate both P(C2 I C1) and P(C3 ] C1) by means of Eq. 7 and Table 2 Hence the chances are 5:2 that the patient has disease 2 but not disease 1, rather than both disease 1 and disease 2.
Next, suppose the patient presented
G=S(1) ? S(2) = C3
The logical analysis tells us that
f=D(1) .D(2) +D(1) .D(2) That is, the patient has either Cl=D(1) .Db(2) orC3=D(1) .D(2)
Determining the conditional probabilities P(CIjC3) and P(C3\C3) according to Table 2, we find: Table 2 . Illustrative values of P(Ck|Ci) and P (Ci). tient most likely has disease 1 and not disease 2 rather than both diseases 1 and 2. Statistics. In our use of probabilities we have tacitly made one subtle assumption that does not belong in the realm of the reasoning foundations of medical diagnosis, but rather in statistics. The assumption is that even though our probabilities, P(C,) and P ( Ck C), by definition, apply only to a randomly selected patient from a known population, we of course are applying the same probabilities to a new patient (not among the known population) who comes to the physician for diagnosis and treatment. The reason we can apply these probabilities to this patient anyway is beyond the scope of this article; it depends on statistical considerations-considerations which, by the way, have proved exceedingly useful for solving practical problems in many walks of life. However, certain general aspects of the statistical problem can serve to illustrate some properties of our probabilistic approach to medical diagnosis.
Note that the physician has no direct control over which particular person will come to him as a patient at any time, and hence his patients are certainly randomly chosen in this sense. Also note that although the patient is not a member of the known population upon which the probabilities were based, the probabilities will apply to him if he is a person who lives under approximately the same circumstances as those of the known population. By "circumstances" we mean geographical area, local community, season of the year, and so forth.
The important results of these observations are twofold. First, since the probabilities, particularly P(C4), depend upon such circumstances, then for each physician or clinic there is a P(Ci). That is to say, in general, nearly all the patients of an individual physician or clinic will be subject to the same circumstances. Thus each such physician or clinic will have its own P(C,) which, in general, will be different at different times. As discussed above, the P(C I Ck) can be used by many physicians over a longer period of time.
Second, if these probabilities are so variable, from place to place and from time to time, the question arises as to how they can be evaluated at all. The answer to this is based on the fact that once a diagnosis has been made for a patient by a particular physician or clinic at a certain time, the symptom-disease complex combination that this patient 3 JULY 1959 has becomes itself a statistic and can be included in a recalculation of the probabilities for this physician or clinic at that time. In other words, the patient for whom the diagnosis has been made automatically becomes a part of the known population upon which the probabilities for those circumstances are based. Thus the known population becomes simply the already-diagnosed cases. Hence the probabilities P(Ci) and P(CklCi) are continuously changing as successive diagnoses are made. Of course, the probabilities should be based on relatively current statistics; hence, after a time, the older cases are dropped from this known population. Actually this recalculation of probabilities is not hard to do. This problem is discussed below.
Value Theory Concepts
Value decisions for treatment: complicated conflict situation. After the diagnosis has been established, the physician must further decide upon the treatment. Often this is a relatively simple, straightforward application of the currently accepted available therapeutic measures relating to the particular diagnosis. On the other hand, and perhaps just as often, the choice of treatment involves an evaluation and estimation of a complicated conflict situation that not only depends on the established diagnosis but also on therapeutic, moral, ethical, social, and economic considerations concerning the individual patient, his family, and the society in which he lives. Similar complicated decision problems frequently arise in military, economic, and political situations; and to aid a more analytical and quantitative approach to these problems, mathematicians have developed "value theory." The striking similarity between these decision problems and the value decisions frequently facing the physician indicate that value theory methods can be applied to the medical decision problem as well. Of the several mathematical forms value theory has taken, we have chosen to discuss that developed principally by Von Neumann (9, 10), often called "game theory."
Expected value. One of the basic concepts upon which value theory rests is that of expected value (8). Suppose we consider 7000 patients, for all of whom two tentative diagnoses, C2 or C3, have been made, with probability 5/7 and 2/7, respectively. Suppose, also, that there exists a treatment T(l) that is 90 percent effective against disease complex C2 and 30 percent effective against disease complex C3. If we use this treatment, what proportion of the 7000 patients should we expect to cure? The answer is given in terms of the "expected value" of the proportion E, which is the sum of the products of the value of the treatment for curing the disease complex and the probability that a patient has the disease complex. For example, about (5/7) (7000), or 5000, will have disease complex C2, and of these we expect that 90 percent, or 4500, will be cured by T(1); similarly, for those with disease complex C3, we expect that 30 percent, or 600, will be cured by T(1). Altogether, we expect that 
100/ 7 M+ l-\ V60770 is the expected value of the proportion of patients cured by T(1).
Suppose, on the other hand, that there is an alternative treatment T(2) for these diseases; it is 10 percent effective against C2 but 100 percent effective: against C3. The problem is: With which treatment will we expect to cure more patients (see Table 3 Table 3 constitutes the payoffs -what the physician will "win," and nature "lose."
15;
For the values of the treatments as given in Table 3 , let us see how the expected value E, and hence the choice of treatment, depends on the probability that the patient has C2 or C3. If P is the probability that a patient has C2, then (1 -P) must be the probability that the patient has C3 (since by supposition the patient has either C2 or C3 but not both). Hence, by Table 3 Up to now we have considered the value of a treatment with respect to a disease complex as being measured directly by its effectiveness in curing the diseases. This, however, may not always be the case. For example, certain kinds of surgery do involve a marked risk; if the surgery is successful, the patient will be cured or benefited; if it is unsuccessful, the patient may die. Hence the value associated with this treatment is more difficult to define. As an illustration, suppose values were chosen between -10 and + 10, as is shown in Table 4 . Then, if the probability that the patient has C2 is 5/7 and the probability that he has C3 is 2/7,
E1= (5) (5/7) + (-10) (2/7) = 5/7 E,2= (-5) (5/7) + (8) (2/7) =-4/7 so that T(1) is the treatment of choice.
If the probabilities were the other way around, that is, if C,= 2/7 and C,= 5/7, then we would have E =-40/7, E2 = 30/7, and T(2) would be the treatment of choice.
Two points still require further discussion. First, we have considered our problem from the point of view of many patients all of whom have the diagnosis C2 or C3, and we have seen how to choose that treatment which will maximize the number of patients cured or maximize some other value for the patients. However, in private practice, the physician is usually concerned with a single individual patient. A little reflec- Mixed strategy. In our development of the reasoning foundations of medical diagnosis for treatment, we first sketched the logical principles involved in the diagnosis; based on the alternative diagnoses presented by the logic, we calculated probabilities for these alternatives; based on these probabilities, we sketched a technique for choosing between methods of treatment. However at the present time, as we observed above, data are not generally available to enable the probabilities to be computed; and in rare diseases such data will be difficult to obtain. Hence selection of the method of treatment must frequently be made based on the logical diagnostic results alone. We now consider a method for determining the best treatment under such circumstances.
Again consider 7000 patients with identical diagnoses of C2 or C3, and suppose the effectiveness of alternative treatments T(1) or T(2) are as given in Table 3 . But this time we do not know the probabilities that the patients have C2 or C3. Our problem is again to choose that treatment which will insure that we cure the largest number of people-that is, to maximize the minimum possible number of patients that we expect will be cured. There are actually three ways we can choose the treatment: (i) treat all patients by T ( 1 ), (ii) treat all patients by T(2), and (iii) treat some patients by T(1) and others by T(2). The first two ways are called "pure strategies," the third, a "mixed strategy."
Consider the values of Table 3 , and suppose we choose the third way of treatment (which really includes the first two anyway). Let Q .be the fraction of patients to be treated by T (1), then  (1 -Q) is the fraction to be treated by T(2). Observe that if all the patients had C2, we would expect to cure To arrange for such a treatment is easy: Separate the patients at random into two groups, one containing (.6) (7000) = 4200 patients, the other containing (.4) (7000) = 2800 patients, the former group to receive T(1), the latter T(2). However, there is another way of arranging for such a treatment, as follows: As each patient comes up for treatment, spin the wheel of chance shown in Fig. 8. If the wheel stops opposite one of the numbers 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 , or 5, the patient receives T(1); if it stops opposite 6, 7, 8, or 9, the patient receives T(2). Since there is an equal chance that the wheel will stop opposite any number, then about 0.6 of the patients will receive T(1) and 0.4 will receive T(2). This process is called "choosing a random number from 0 to 9." Actually, one does not need to spin a wheel of chance to get random numbers: books have been published containing nothing but millions of random numbers (11, 12) .
Why do we bring up random numbers when all we really needed to do was divide our 7000 patients into two groups? To treat the 7000 patients, the two-group technique is perfectly adequate; but let us consider again the physician who is concerned at the moment with a single patient. He cannot very well divide up the patient into two groups. To help this physician out, we interpret Q as the probability that the patient should receive T(1), and then (1-Q) is the probability that the patient should receive T(2). With this interpretation, the above discussion shows that by choosing Q to be .6, the chance or probability of curing the patient is maximized to .58. Hence the physician chooses a single random integer: if it is 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5, the patient gets  T(1); if it is 6, 7, 8, or 9 , the patient gets T(2). This is the concept of a mixed strategy applied to a single case.
Such a method for choosing the treatment may be very hard to appreciate at first contact, but this is just the method used every day when probabilities are applied to single situations. Of course, in actual practice, some further information bearing on the choice of treatment would be sought-that is to say, the formulation of the problem of which treatment to give the patient is far more complicated than that posed by the single problem discussed above. In conclusion, we may quote J. D. Williams (13) on the role of game theory:
"While there are specific applications today, despite the current limitations of the theory, perhaps its greatest contribution so far has been an intangible one: the general orientation given to people who are faced with overcomplex problems. Even though these problems are not strictly solvable-it helps to have a framework in which to work on them. The concepts of a strategy, the repre-2/7 '5 Probability P What treatments should be used? The physician decides that some treatment is absolutely necessary and that there are two possibilities, x-ray therapy to the mass or surgery.
There are some arguments for and some against each treatment. This type of problem is susceptible to value theory analysis. The physicians set up the arguments pro and con for each treatment as follows: 1) X-ray therapy to the mass [hereafter referred to as T (1) Setting up the illustration. The above case history suggests an appropriate simplification that we can make for purposes of illustration. Let us limit our attention to just the three diseases D(l1), D(2), and D(3) (large thymus, deep hemangioma, and dermoid cyst, respectively), the three symptoms S ( 1 ), S(2), and S(3) (respiratory distress, several surface hemangiomas, and mediastinal mass on chest x-ray, respectively), and the two treatments T(1) and T(2) (x-ray therapy and surgery, respectively). Of course a realistic application of the techniques developed above would require consideration of the hundreds of diseases and symptoms associated with, say, a particular specialty. However, within the limited space allowed the present article, we are forced to confine our attention to the three diseases and three symptoms suggested by the case history. The discussion of a method permitting the feasible application of our techniques to more realistic circumstances is given in the following section.
We shall now digress for a moment from the case history in order to set up the illustration. Since we are considering only three symptoms, there are 23 = 8 conceivable symptom complexes; for our three diseases there are likewise 23 = 8 conceivable disease complexes; therefore there are 23+3 = 64 columns in our logi- . 9 ). Further, let us suppose that the population of patients under consideration is such that they can have no other symptoms or diseases than those given above, and that each patient must have at least one of the symptoms and at least one of the diseases. Let us suppose that medical knowledge consists of the following three observations: 
G=S(1) .S(2) .S(3)
By the technique described above, it is easy to see the logical diagnosis:
f=D ( 
(1) .D(2) .D(3)
Note that this is the same diagnosis as for the patient with symptoms G =
S(1) S(2) 'S(3).
In other words, if, when the x-ray was taken, positive results were obtained, the diagnosis remains the same as it was before the x-ray results were known. On the other hand, suppose the x-ray turned out negative; then the patient's symptoms would be
G=S(1) .S(2) .S(3)
whence it is easy to see that the diagnosis becomes
f=D(l) .D(2) .D(3)
In this case the additional information obtained from the x-ray film enabled the diagnosis to be reduced from four disease complex possibilities to a unique disease complex diagnosis. This example illustrated the interesting fact that additional diagnostic information may not always result in further differentiation between disease complexes, depending on the circumstances.
As a final example of logical diagnosis, consider a patient that presents
G=S(1) .S(2) .S(3)
Here we find Examples of probabilistic diagnosis. In order to present these examples we must have a table of conditional and total probabilities. In Fig. 10 we present such a table; however the numbers in the table do not have any basis in fact, they were just made up for the purposes of the illustration. They are, however, selfconsistent in themselves and consistent with the logical assumptions made above. The cross-hatched probabilities are all 0 and correspond to symptom-disease complex combinations that are not possible according to medical knowledge.
f=D(1) .D(2) .D(3) + D(1). D(2)? D(3) + D(1) .D2) D(2) ) + D(1) .D(2) .D(3)
Consider the patient with symptom complex
G=S(1) .S(2) .S(3) =C4
We found by logical analysis that the patient can have one of the following disease complexes:
D(1) . D(2) . D(3) = C1 D(1) .D(2) .D(3) =C2 D(l) .D(2) .D(3) =C4 D(1) .D(2) .D(3) =C6
Hence, by the techniques described above, we have: and -10, the greatest value (the best treatment for a particular situation) being + 10, the smallest (for the worst treatment) being -10 (see Table 5 ). If statistics were available on the outcomes 3 
G=S(1) .S(2) .S(3)
we determine for the value of treatment T(1) (the x-ray treatment) by means of the techniques described above, as follows: On the other hand, suppose we did not know or could not calculate the probabilities P(C1iC4), P(C2JC4), P(C4IC4), and P(C6\C4) due to lack of sufficient statistical data or for other reasons. The problem is to choose the treatment which will maximize the minimum gain for the patient. The graphical solution of this problem according to the techniques discussed above is given in Fig. 11 . Hence T(1) should be chosen with probability 0.61 over T(2) with probability 0.39.
Conditional Probability or
Learning Device
A device often called a conditional probability or learning machine can be used to implement the foregoing logical and probabilistic analysis of medical diagnosis. The particular form of such a device that we shall describe was chosen for its extreme simplicity and ready availability. It can collect data rapidly, and it easily recalculates the probabilities at each use. With such a device the variation of P(Ci) with location, season, and so forth, can be checked as well as relative stability of P(C"jCi). As described here, it is essentially an experimental tool, but undoubtedly more sophisticated forms of the device could be further developed.
Consider the logical analysis of medical diagnosis first. In a realistic application perhaps 300 diseases and 400 symptoms must be considered as, for example, might occur within a medical specialty. The logical basis for such a set of symptoms and diseases would require 2700 columns (more than 10200) from which the elimination of columns for the reduced basis would be made. This is obviously impracticable. However, the columns to be eliminated correspond to disease-symptom complexes that will never occur; the reduced basis corresponds to columns that will occur. Hence, by listing many cases by diseasesymptom complex combination, the reduced basis will soon be generated. This can be done, for example, with marginal notched cards, as follows: Positions along the edge of a card are assigned to the diseases and symptoms under consideration. After a case has been diagnosed, the positions on the edge of a single card are notched corresponding to the diseases the patient has, as well as the presented symptoms. This card then represents a column of the desired reduced basis. In this way the entire reduced basis can soon be generated (see Fig. 12 ). The probabilistic analysis of medical diagnosis is obtained by notching a card for every patient who has been diagnosed. Then there will be, in general, more than one card representing a single column of the logical basis. The number of cards representing columns C. Ci is then just N(Ck Ci) of Eq. 6. After a To make a diagnosis, sort out those cards that correspond to the symptom complex presented by the patient. The disease complex part of these cards gives all possible disease complexes the patient can have. Separate these cards by the symptom complexes: the thicknesses of the resulting separated decks will be proportional to the probability of the patient's having the respective disease complexes (see Fig. 14) .
To determine P(Ci), sort the cards for Ci; then P(C,) is the ratio of the thickness of the sorted cards to the thickness of the entire deck of cards. To determine P(CkjCi), sort the cards for Ci and measure their thickness; then sort these for Ck and measure their thickness; then P(CkICi) is the ratio of the former to the latter measurements.
After each diagnosis is made, a card is notched accordingly and placed with the deck. Old cards are periodically thrown away. This keeps the statistics current. In general, the decks will grow exceedingly rapidly. In a clinic it is often normal to diagnose over 100 patients per day; at this rate only 10 days will result in 1000 cards.
It is important to observe that we are
Conclusions
Three factors are involved in the logical analysis of medical diagnosis: (i) medical knowledge that relates disease complexes to symptom complexes; (ii) the particular symptom complex presented by the patient; (iii) and the disease complexes that are the final diagnosis. The effect of medical knowledge is to eliminate from consideration disease complexes that are not related to the symptom complex presented. The resulting diagnosis computed by means of logic is essentially a list of the possible disease complexes that the patient can have that are consistent with medical knowledge and the patient's symptoms. Equation 2 is the fundamental formula for the logical analysis of medical diagnosis.
The "most likely" diagnosis is determined by calculating the conditional probability that a patient presenting these symptoms has each of the possible disease complexes under consideration. This probability depends upon two contributing factors. The first factor is the conditional probability that a patient with a certain disease complex will have a particular symptom complex (that is, just the reverse of the afore-mentioned conditional probability); it remains relatively independent of local factors and depends primarily on the physiopathological effects of the disease complex itself. The second factor is the effect on the medical diagnosis of the circumstances surrounding the patient or, more precisely, the total probability that any person chosen from the particular population sample under consideration will have the particular disease complex under consideration; this may depend on the geographical location of the population sample, or the season when the sample is chosen, or whether the population sample is chosen during an epidemic, or whether the sample is composed of patients visiting a particular type of specialist or clinic, and so forth.
The afore-mentioned probabilities are continually changing; each diagnosis, as it is made, itself becomes a statistic that changes the value of these probabilities. Such changing probabilities reflect the spread of new epidemics, or new strains of antibiotic-resistant bacteria, or the discovery of new and better techniques of diagnosis and treatment, or new cures and preventive measures, or changes in social and economic standards, and so forth. This observation emphasizes the greater significance and value of current statistics; it depreciates the significance of past statistics. Equation 8 above, which is an adaptation of Bayes' formula, summarizes the probabilistic analysis of medical diagnosis.
Use of value theory enables the systematic computation of the optimum strategy to be used in any situation. It does not, however, determine the values of the treatments involved. It is quite evident that the choice of such values involves intangibles which must be evaluated and judged by the physician. However, by clearly separating the strategy problem from the values judgment problem, the physician is left free to concentrate his whole attention on the latter. One of the most important and novel contributions to the value theory for our purpose is the concept of the mixed strategy for approaching value decisions.
The mathematical techniques that we have discussed and the associated use of computers are intended to be an aid to the physician. This method in no way implies that a computer can take over the physician's duties. Quite the reverse; it implies that the physician's task may become more complicated. The physician may have to learn more; in addition to the knowledge he presently needs, he may also have to know the methods and techniques under consideration in this paper. However, the benefit that we hope may be gained to offset these increased difficulties is the ability to make a more precise diagnosis and a more scientific determination of the treatment plan (15).
